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The Population Explosion and United
States Law
By Johnson C. Montgomery*
THE Population explosion is the unique problem of our age. Its
magnitude has only recently been recognized, and consequently, there
is no existing body of law dealing with the questions raised by the neces-
sity of instituting population control measures. That there is a "right"
to found a family and have children cannot be seriously questioned.
What limitations can be imposed on that right, however, is one of the
most serious problems that will confront our courts in the future. Its
resolution will require a critical analysis of the governmental powers
that might be used to deal with the problem, and the limitations on the
exercise of those powers.
Reasonable men differ as to the seriousness of the population prob-
lem, and the legal solution adopted necessarily depends on a factual
determination of the degree of crisis overpopulation represents. Be-
fore discussing the various means with which we might try to curb
population growth, therefore, it may be helpful to examine briefly the
extent of the problem.
I. The Problem
A. The Population Explosion
1. The World Population
Man has been present on the earth for only a small fraction of the
planet's existence. If the 4.5 billion-year history of the earth were
likened to a day, man has been here for well under 1 minute.'
During the first few million years of man's history the human
population did not exceed three million persons. It did not reach five
million until about 8,000 B.C., and did not grow to 500 million until
around 1650. Since then growth has continued unabated; the popu-
lation doubled to 1 billion by 1850, doubled again by 1930 and by
1970 it had nearly reached 4 billion. The doubling time is now less
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than 37 years.2
Most intelligent people are aware that there is a population prob-
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The suddenness of the problem can be understood by extending
the base line beginning at 8,000 B.C. back for the full period of man's
existence. Were the graph drawn to scale to show the entire base
line, it would be more than 150-feet long to the left. Similarly, the
magnitude of the problem can be visualized if the curve were extended
forward in time; the entire world from core to outer atmosphere would
be solid people in 1,000 years and the mass of humanity would be ex-
panding outward at the speed of light by the year 5,700.
The present pattern of man's growth obviously will not continue
indefinitely; the laws of physics and biology make it impossible.' The
2. P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION RESOURCES ENVIRONMENT 5-23 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as EmLICH & EHRLICH].
3. From the late 1700s when Thomas Malthus first published his AN ESSAY
ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798) until the mid-twentieth century, little
attention was given to the population problem. Recently there have been a number
of excellent publications which prove conclusively that the population problem is not
merely a Malthusian notion made irrelevant by technological advances. See, e.g., G.
BORGSTROM, Too MANY (1969); P. Cloud, Mineral Resources From the Sea, in RE-
SOURCES AND MAN (1969); R. DUMONT & B. ROSIER, THE HUNGRY FUTURE (1961);
P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1969); EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 2; K.
SAX, STANDING ROOM ONLY (1955); PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITrEE, THE
WORLD FOOD PROBLEM, vols. 1-3 (1967). For additional sources, see the extensive
bibliography in EHRLICH & EHRLICH.
4. Fremlin, How Many People Can the World Support?, 24 NEw Scmm-sST
285, 286-87 (1964). It has been persuasively argued that man's recent history consti-
tutes a mere, brief moment in the sun-a short period of tremendous production and
considerable affluence which cannot continue because it involved a looting and polluting
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only question is what will bring it to a halt.5 There appear to be only
two alternatives: an increase in the death rate, or a reduction in the birth
rate.
2. Population in the United States
Many believe that, regardless of the world population problem, the
United States itself is not overpopulated. The optimum population
size for the United States, however, has been given little attention. It
is hoped this problem will be considered by President Nixon's Commis-
sion on Population Growth and the American Future.'
The United States presently has about 6 percent of the world's
population and yet accounts for about 30 percent of the world's con-
sumption of nonrenewable resources.7 There is a national pollution
problem which in part results from having to produce too much, too
fast for too many." It is generally recognized that the nation as a whole
does not at present adequately feed, clothe or care for its existing popu-
lation, and the situation is apparently deteriorating rather than im-
of the planet and a raping of nonrenewable natural resources. See R. REiNOW & L
RFNqow, MoMENT iN THE SuN (1967). Certainly if a major catastrophe occurs it will
not be possible for human survivors simply to start over again. All easily usable
natural resources have already been depleted. Land has been denuded; the tin of
Britain, the iron ore of the Mesabi and the tar on the surface of the ground at La Brea
are gone. The rise of a new industrial civilization, starting from scratch, is im-
possible.
5. It may well be famine. See W. PADDOCK & P. PADDOCK, FAmnm 1975
(1967). The most recent Food and Agricultural Organization reports on 1969 food
production fully support the pessimistic view of the world food problem presented by
the Paddocks, although the precise time of the onset of catastrophic famines remains
an open question. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1970, at 10, col 1. People unrealistically
believe that science and technology can solve our food problems-in spite of detailed
analyses showing it cannot. Ehrlich & Holdren, Population and Panaceas: A Tech-
nological Perspective, 19 BIOL. SCIENCE 1065 (1969). It involves great risk to rely on
science's ability to continue to pull technological rabbits out of hats. The world is
finite and magic would be required to make it otherwise.
6. Pub. L. No. 91-213 (Mar. 16, 1970) requires the Presidential Commission to
"sponsor.. . studies and research and make such recommendations . .. regarding a
broad range of problems associated with population growth and their implications for
America's future." The statutory mandate of the commission is broad enough to
require study of world population-resource problems. It is the specific duty of the
commission to make recommendations by "various means appropriate to the ethical
values and principles of this society by which our Nation can achieve a population
level properly suited for its environmental, natural resources, and other needs." The
composition of the commission gives rise to considerable optimism that sound recom.
mendations will be made. The fate of previous reports from Presidential Commis-
sions makes it questionable whether such recommendations will be followed.
7. EunIcH & EHRLICH, supra note 2, at 61.
8. See note 12 infra.
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The optimum population for the United States, or for the world,
depends upon value judgments. The number of people the nation can
support increases as each individual decides to accept less comfort,
privacy and environmental amenity. Few are willing to accept less,
however; most want more. Merely to retain the existing amenities,
therefore, ultimately depends upon having fewer people to support.
Furthermore, the United States cannot separate itself from the
global population-resource-environment problem. The earth is a closed
system. Each nation depends on the rest of the world and on the func-
tioning of the planetary ecosystem for its resources. The population
problem cannot be dismissed by any nation simply by relegating the
undesirable effects of overpopulation to its less fortunate neighbors.
B. The Effects of Overpopulation
An authoritative analysis of the undesirable effects of the population
explosion is beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, an area
that has received increasing attention in recent years. Although there is
still much to learn, convincing evidence now exists for many of the
potentially catastrophic problems that scientists and analysts are pres-
ently attributing to overpopulation. Among these problems are: (1)
malnutrition, starvation and the possibility of world-wide famine; 10 (2)
anti-social behavior and the disintegration of established social or-
ders;1 (3) environmental pollution of staggering proportions;12 and
(4) increasing economic costs to every segment of the society, including
9. Cf. G. BORGSTROM, Too MANY (1969); P. CLOUD, RESOURCES AND MAN
(1969); L. DAY & A. DAY, Too MANY AMERICANS (1964); R. DUMONT & B. ROSIER,
THE HUNGRY FUTURE (1969); EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 2. There is no direct
authority for this proposition, but it is an inescapable conclusion of the facts as re-
cited in the foregoing studies. See Femlin, How Many People Can the World Sup-
port?, 24 NEW SCIENTIST 285 (1964).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. There is laboratory evidence, for example, that animals in a crowded en-
vironment resort to aggressive and destructive behavior. Calhoun, Population Density
and Social Pathology, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Feb. 1962, vol. 206. at 139-48. Similar ef-
fects have been predicted for human beings. Freedman & Ehrlich 22, 28 (unpublished
manuscript at Dep't of Biology Stanford Univ. 1970). See Bates, Crowded People,
NATURAL HISTORY, Oct. 1968, vol. 78, at 20; N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1969, at 49 col. 1;
Fischer, Community Psychiatry and the Population Explosion, 106 CAL. MEDICINE
189, 189-95 (1967); Fiennes, Stress in a Crowded World, 19 NEW SCIENTIST 595,
595-96 (1963); Russell & Russell, The Sardine Syndrome, THE ECOLOGIST, Aug.
1970, vol. 1, at 4-9.
12. L. DAY & A. DAY, Too MANY AMERICANS 56-68 (1964); W. MARX, THE
FRAIL OCEAN (1967); R. REINOW & L. REINOW, MOMENT IN THE SUN 94-95 (1967);




These are only a few of the more obvious problems resulting from
the population explosion, and each of them is manifest in varying de-
grees to even the most casual observer of today's cultural and physical
environment. Even if it is conceded that each of these social maladies
has contributory causes other than rampant population growth, it none-
theless remains true that effective population control measures will con-
tribute to their reduction or elimination, and that continued, indiscrimi-
nate growth in the population can only lead to their reaching crisis
proportions beyond man's ability to rectify.
C. Alternative Solutions
Many who concede the existence of the population problem
nevertheless insist that its solution lies in less drastic measures than
limiting the permissible population growth. The solutions proposed
to date, however, are unrealistic and in some cases simply ignore the
unalterable fact that many of the earth's life-sustaining resources are in
limited supply and are nonrenewable.
The availability of untapped resources and technology's capacity
to utilize them has received much speculative attention, but intensive
scientific study has indicated that the deserts, jungles and oceans on the
earth's surface will fall far short of popular expectation in meeting the
resource demands of an expanding population.14 Nor do the other
planets in the solar system pose a realistic solution, either as a source of
vital resources or as the object of interplanetary migration. 5 Similarly,
population redistribution can be at best only a temporary solution.
There are already too many people for the life-support systems of the
planet to accommodate on a sustained basis,' 6 and dispersal does not
diminish demand.
One of the most widely advocated solutions to population growth
13. E. MISHAN, THE CosTs OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1967). See Los ANGELES
COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT GuiDE
(1970).
14. EHRLICH & EHRLICH 299; Ehrlich & Holdren, Population and Panaceas: A
Technological Perspective, 19 BIOL. SCIENCE 1065 (1969); McNeil, Lateritic Soils,
ScIENTIIC AMERICAN, Nov. 1964, vol. 211, at 99-102. In 1969, in spite of greatly in-
creased effort, fishing catches declined for the first time since 1950. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1970, at 10, col. 1.
15. Hardin, Interstellar Migration as an Answer to the Population Problem, 50
HEREDITY 68-69 (1959); see von Hoernor, The General Limits of Space Travel, 13
SCIENCE 18, 23 (1962).
16. See Borgstrom, Dual Challenge of Health & Hunger-A Global Crisis, in 31
PoPUtATIoN REFERENCE BUREAU SELECTION No. 31 at 2-4 (1970).
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is the adoption of family planning techniques. Family planning, how-
ever, will not necessarily curtail the rapid expansion of the population
or the demands of the population on the earth's resources. The popu-
lation of the United States will double before the end of the next cen-
tury, even without the birth of an unwanted child,17 and will still reach
300 million by 2045 if each living woman gives birth to only one female
child who survives to reproductive age.' Consumption of natural re-
sources will increase accordingly.
The goal of population control is not merely to limit the growth
of population, but also to reduce the enormous demands that human
populations make on the earth's nonrenewable resources. If family
planning cannot solve the population problem in the United States, its
failure can only be more pronounced in those areas of the world where
resources and education are limited and where there is a greater cul-
tural impetus to reproduce.
D. How the Problem Has Been Ignored
The legal profession has largely ignored the problems posed by the
population explosion.'" While legal literature is replete with articles
dealing with the Rule Against Perpetuities, there is not a single article
analyzing the obvious problem which is making perpetuities impossible.
The legal issues are complex. In the United States they involve
sources of constitutional power-the general welfare clause, the com-
merce clause and the 14th amendment. Also involved are limitations
on the exercise of such power-due process, equal protection, separa-
tion of church and state, reserved powers of the states and retained
rights of the people.
Since Ricardo published his classic Principles of Political Economy
17. Bumpass & Westoff, The "Perfect Contraceptive," 169 ScIENCE 1177, 1181
(1970).
18. Frejka, Reflections on the Demographic Conditions Needed to Establish a
U.S. Stationary Population Growth, 23 POPULATION STUDIES 379-97 (1968). Even
given the present, unusually low birthrate in the United States, we will more than
double our existing population by the year 2020. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PROJEC-
TIONS oF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE AND SEX (INTERIM REVI-
SIONs): 1970 to 2020 (Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 448, 1970).
19. A number of articles have recognized the problem but have not treated the
specific legal issues. See Blaustein, Arguendo: The Legal Challenge of Population
Control, 3 L. & Soc. REv. 107 (1968); Clark, Law as an Intrument of Population
Control, 40 U. CoLo. L. REv. 179 (1968); Moore, Legal Action to Stop our Population
Explosion, 12 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 314 (1963); Falk, World Population and Interna-
tional Law, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 514 (1969). Legal issues involved specifically in
abortion have been well analyzed. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the
Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730 (1968).
(Vol. 22
and Taxation in 1817, little attention has been given to the problems
involved in a stable, nongrowth economy. Few authors have treated
the subject of a stable economy, and while it may be possible to have an
expanding economy which is not based on growth,20 most of our eco-
nomic theory has been based on the impossible assumption of infinite
growth.
If the patterns of man's growth are to change, there must be a
concomitant change in the basic assumptions underlying that growth.
A fundamental revision is necessary in our present growth-oriented
economy, and new economic theories must be developed that are more
in harmony with the concept of a stable population. The production
and distribution mechanisms comprising the existing economic proc-
esses may have to be restructured, and cost-benefit analyses used to
analyze the economic feasibility of a social development must be ex-
panded to include the costs and benefits to our environmental resources.
Implementation of revised economic processes will require com-
parable reevaluation of many existing legal institutions and concepts.
Laws relating to commerce, taxation and land use controls already de-
serve serious scrutiny, and it is not improbable that in the future, the law
will require society to hold all of the earth's resources in trust for future
generations. 21 Similarly, laws relating to domestic relationships may
well require revamping. The family has always been child-oriented,
and while human sexual drives are clearly distinguishable from the urge
to reproduce, they have nevertheless contributed to the population ex-
plosion. The law must become flexible enough to promote the forma-
tion of new social institutions and inter-personal relationships whose
principal functions do not include the reproduction and raising of chil-
dren. This may require not only greater tolerance of homosexuality
and non-child-oriented communes, but also specific measures designed to
encourage their proliferation.
2 2
Ours is an age of contingency planning. Yet little has been done
20. Wager, Growth versus the Quality of Life 168 SCIENCE, 1179-84 (1970); see
Boulding, The Economics of a Coming Space Ship Earth, ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL=rY IN A
GRowING ECONOmY 3-14 (1966); Welles, The Economy Doesn't Need More People, The
Wall Street Journal, Apr. 22, 1970, at 22, cols. 3-5.
21. It may also be necessary to abandon the legal concept of the commons-a
resource such as grazing land, water or air which is available to all-and to substitute
for that concept a system of coercive limitation on all resource utilization. See
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1247-48 (1968).
22. Four communes known to the author in wealthy areas of the San Francisco
Peninsula presently contain 42 adults, including 20 females between the ages of 20 and
35, and only 7 children. No children have been born to members of these communes
within the last 2 years.
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to plan for those contingencies which innevitably will either interrupt
our rampant population growth or follow as its consequence. That so
little has been done in an area having such far-reaching implications for
the future of mankind borders on reckless irresponsibility.
II. Solutions to the Problem
A. Voluntary Methods of Population Control
There is a wide variety of measures available to reduce birth rates.
A number of them involve additional social benefits that make them de-
sirable apart from their value as population control techniques; the re-
peal of anti-abortion laws, for example, would terminate "compulsory"
pregnancy and provide an increased measure of freedom for women.
Generally, the methods to control population growth can be classed
as either voluntary or involuntary. Economic incentives, subsidies and
comparable devices can properly be characterized as voluntary, while
the licensing of births, enforced by criminal sanctions, must be charac-
terized as compulsory. The distinction between voluntary and compul-
sory methods is sometimes blurred, but among the methods which can
generally be characterized as voluntary are the following:
1. The repeal of all laws limiting the advertising, dissemination
and use of birth control information, devices and drugs. Although
existing laws are probably unconstitutional under the holding in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,23 the mere fact that such laws exist probably tends
to discourage many persons who might otherwise be actively involved
in making effective birth control techniques available.
2. The repeal of all laws limiting the right to abortion. While it
is not presently clear whether existing state anti-abortion laws are con-
stitutional, 24 People v. Belous, 25 and United States v. Vuitch26 strongly
suggest that they are not. The United States Supreme Court has yet to
to rule on the questions involved, but it seems likely there will be left to
the legislatures some power to regulate abortion.
27
23. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1964) (states may not outlaw use of contraceptives).
See Baird v. Eisenhadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970).
24. Greenhouse, Constitutional Question: Is There a Right to Abortion, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 30-31, 88-91; Lucas, Federal Constitutional
Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46
N.C.L. REv. 730, 752-76 (1968).
25. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 915 (1970).
26. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1970), juris. question reserved, 397 U.S. 1061
(1970).
27. Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1970); People v.
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3. The repeal of all laws limiting sterilization. It has recently
been held that there is no public policy forbidding voluntary steriliza-
tion,2 18 but many doctors and hospitals are nevertheless reluctant to per-
form sterilization procedures. One reason for reluctance on the part
of the medical community is the ever-present risk of malpractice actions
in the event of an unwanted pregnancy. This problem is particularly
acute when male sterilization is involved since a properly sterilized male
provides no guarantee that the female will not become pregnant through
other sexual relationships. One solution to the malpractice problem
could involve legislation relieving doctors from responsibility for preg-
nancies claimed to have occurred subsequent to sterilization proce-
dures.
29
4. The subsidizing of contraception, sterilization and abortion for
all persons, including minors by: (a) requiring group and individual
health insurance policies to cover the costs of such procedures; (b) au-
thorizing direct payment of such costs through government welfare and
medicare programs; and (c) enacting emancipated minor laws to re-
move the requirement that parents consent to such procedures for their
minor children.
5. Cash payments to individuals who are willing to undergo sterili-
zation procedures.
6. Payment of an annual subsidy to each woman of childbearing
age who does not give birth during a given year. 0 A subsidy program
coupled with free contraception and abortion would clearly be a proper
expenditure of federal funds under the general welfare provision of the
Federal Constitution" and probably would accomplish much toward
solving the domestic population problem. The wisdom of such a pro-
gram would depend in part upon a detailed cost-benefit analysis, but
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969). Dicta in both
cases indicates a judicial reluctance to totally deprive the states of some power in this
area. See text accompanying notes 116-19 infra. The Supreme Court does not ap-
pear likely to reach this question in the immediate future.
28. Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 748, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366
(1969).
29. Laws should also be enacted to permit nurses and other specially trained
para-medical personnel to perform birth control, sterilization and possibly even abor-
tion procedures. There is an acute shortage of doctors in the United States, and it
does not require a doctor with broad training to perform the rather simple pro-
cedures involved in the population control field.
30. Such a subsidy could be increased for each successive year in which no
child was born and could also involve the deprivation of all or part of the subsidy in
years following the birth of a child.
31. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
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preliminary examination strongly suggests that its costs would be far
less than the tax dollar expense of raising children.3 -
7. Revising the tax laws by: (a) removing the exemption for
children or for all children after the first two;33 (b) eliminating the
present federal tax rate disadvantage of single individuals; (c) granting
tax deductions for all monies spent for contraception, sterilization and
abortion, or by granting a direct credit against the taxpayer's liabilty for
such expenditures; (d) giving tax exempt status to organizations whose
purpose is to encourge population limitation; or (e) conferring tax-
deductibility status to gifts to organizations whose purpose is to en-
courage population limitation.
8. Raising the age at which people can marry.
9. Allocating funds for research on: (a) the technology of con-
traception, 34 sterilization and abortion, or (b) the development of
methods to encourage population control. 5
10. Requiring that radio and television stations devote a specified
period of time to encouraging people to limit the size of their families. "
11. Providing women with fulfilling activity unrelated to child-
bearing; this necessarily encompasses an end to de facto sexual discrimi-
nation in education, employment, promotion and compensation.
12. Legalizing homosexuality and providing the legal framework
to define personal and property rights between persons desiring to form
living groups not patterned after the traditional, child-oriented family.
In addition to specific changes in its laws, the nation needs
courageous leadership from its government officials. Although he
32. 116 CoNG. REC. 47 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1970).
33. S. 3632, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
34. Development and testing of a fertility inhibiting compound which could be
added to the public water supply presents serious practical as well as legal difficulties.
See Djerrasi, Birth Control After 1984, 169 SCIENCE 941, 948-49 (1970). But if
such a compound could be developed, there seems to be no constitutional impediment to
its actual use. See Krause v. City of Cleveland, 55 Ohio Op. 36, 39, 121 N.E.2d 311, 315
(Ct. App. 1954) (floridation held not to violate first amendment); Dowell v. City of
Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859, 864 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1954); Kaul v. City
of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 625, 277 P.2d 352, 357 (1954).
35. There is also a need for research into a process which will permit us to con-
trol the gender of offspring. One excuse often given for existing large families is the
desire after several girls to try "one last time" for a boy. It may soon be possible to
control gender. See Rorvik & Shettles, You Can Choose Your Baby's Sex, LoOK,
Apr. 21, 1970, at 88, 93-94.
36. This could be justified under the existing Federal Communications Commis-
sion "fairness" or "public interest" doctrines. Some media are willing voluntarily to
provide free time for this public service. See Growald, Free Radio and TV for ZPG,
ZPG NAT'L REP. Oct. 1970, vol. 2, at 22.
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subsequently modified his position, President Eisenhower once said
that family planning was not a proper sphere of activity for the govern-
ment.37  President Johnson made numerous statements which periph-
erally recognized the seriousness of the population problem, but at no
time did he publicly come out squarely in favor of population control.3"
Public officials and leaders should lend their support to voluntary
means of achieving population stabilization, since it is clearly a more
workable and politically expedient method than compulsion. A strong
statement from the President would accomplish a great deal in alleviat-
ing the national population problem.
B. Compulsory Methods of Population Control
In the event that voluntary methods are unsuccessful, compulsory
programs will be necessary. Whether compulsory programs are con-
stitutional is doubtful today. It has been argued that
the major significance of [Griswold v. Connecticut] is that it es-
tablishes a principle of voluntarism. This principle recognizes and
protects the right of parents to "choose the number of children
within the dictates of individual conscience." 39
Assuming the principle of voluntarism is presently accepted by the
courts, changing facts can produce changing constitutional results. 0
Compulsory programs of population control may be unconstitutional
today, but they will become constitutional as the population explosion
continues. The Constitution is undoubtedly flexible enough so that it
will not be an instrument of extinction.
In order of increasing undesirability, the various compulsory meth-
ods of population control are as follows:
1. Issuing every woman a non-assignable license to have two nat-
ural children, with a fine or imprisonment as sanctions for giving birth
without a license.
2. Requiring women to use effective contraceptive techniques.
37. Clark, Law ar an Instrument of Population Control, 40 U. COLO. L. REv.
179, 186 n.47 (1968).
38. Hearings on S. 1676 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Aid Expenditure of the
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 3, pt. 1, at 3-9
(1967).
39. Pilpel, Birth Control and a New Birth of Freedom, 27 Omo ST. LJ. 679,
690 (1966).
40. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937). The history of the com-
merce clause amply supports changing interpretations of the scope of federal power.
Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) with United States -v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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This method is not presently technologically feasible,41 but presumably
advances in technology could result in compounds which could be ad-
ministered monthly or annually, perhaps by subcutaneous drug capsule






111. Power to Control Population
Some power to control population composition and growth has al-
ways existed. 45 Rapid technological progress in contraception, steriliza-
tion and abortion, however, has created new regulatory potential, and
such potential will undoubtedly continue to increase as research and
development continue.
In the United States, the question of what governmental entities
have the right to regulate the population growth is crucial. 46 National
governments have always purported to have the power to preserve them-
41. See note 34 supra.
42. It may be argued that compulsory abortion is even more extreme than com-
pulsory sterilization since abortion may be considered a more repugnant invasion of
the physical person than simple sterilization. Compare Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (pumping the stomach incident to a narcotics search held unconstitu-
tional) with Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 914 (1958) (searching the rectum incident to a narcotics search at the borde.
held constitutional). Since female sterilization presently involves major surgery inside
the body cavity, whereas male sterilization is minor and external, it might be consti-
tutional to require male sterilization but not female sterilization. Since sterilization
(male or female) is presently a more permanent medical procedure than abortion, ster-
ilization clearly presents a greater diminution of the right to procreate than does a
single abortion.
43. Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (compulsory sterilization of
feeble-minded female held constitutional) with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (compulsory sterilization of male habitual criminal held unconstitutional).
See notes 109-11 & accompanying text infra.
44. Infanticide would require a constitutional amendment because infants are
undoubtedly "persons" whose lives are protected by the 14th amendment. A fetus,
even a viable, quickened fetus, is probably not a "person" within the meaning of the
14th amendment. See notes 94-106 & accompanying text infra.
45. Until relatively recent times, wars have played a significant role in limiting
the population growth. Governments and societies have also employed slavery, exe-
cution, infanticide and genocide as means to accomplish social objectives, all of which
have had a marked influence on population growth and composition.
46. The pre-existence of such technological potential is a reqiusite for the exer-
cise of the power to regulate population by the state and Federal Governments.
Properly analyzed, the conferral of enumerated powers on the Federal Government is
an allocation of right to exercise such powers.
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selves and their people, and such power is often claimed as a matter of
right47 It involves a basic biological concept-survival. The Con-
stitution of the United States, however, imposes severe limitations on the
exercise of power by the Federal Government; the federal system, involv-
ing both enumerated" and reserved powers49 and retained rights,50
further complicates the analysis of governmental power to regulate
population growth.
It is possible to analyze the enumerated and reserved powers as if
the Constitution divided all the power existing at the time of its enact-
ment among the various levels of the federal system. Of that power,
only some was expressly granted to the Federal Government. Other
powers were reserved to the states, while some then-existing rights were
purportedly left to the people themselves. Neither the population prob-
lem nor the contemporary potential to deal with it existed when the
Constitution was enacted, however, and it therefore becomes necessary
to determine who obtained the right to exercise this newly-achieved po-
tential. Such a determination requires an analysis of the powers of the
Federal Government under the welfare clause, the commerce clause
and section 5 of the 14th amendment. The powers of the states must
also be examined, as must the limitations imposed on the exercise of
governmental power by the Bill of Rights and the 14th amendment.
A. Power of the Federal Government
1. Spending Power
Pursuant to article I, section 8 of the Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes. .. and
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States ....
The welfare clause has been construed not as an independent grant
of regulatory power, but as a limitation on the power to tax and to
spend.5 1 Congress has the power to spend for any project which pro-
motes the national, as opposed to merely local welfare,52 and it has
been held that the concept of general welfare is not static;5 3 the power
47. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; J. BRiERLY, THE LAW Op NATIONS 403-12 (1963); J.
STARxE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 402-05 (1963).
48. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5.
49. Id. amend. X.
50. Id. amend. IX.
51. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936).
52. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-44 (1937).
53. Id. at 641.
February 19711
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
expands as national needs expand. Furthermore, the Federal Govern-
ment, unless barred by some constitutional prohibition, may impose
terms and conditions upon its disbursement of money to the states and
any state law or regulation inconsistent with such federal terms is to
that extent invalid.54 Federal spending for projects involving en-
vironmental problems such as flood control, prevention of soil erosion
and the establishment of game refuges has been held to be proper un-
der the welfare clause. 5  It has even been suggested that Congress
could, under the welfare clause, enact national divorce laws.56
Since the balance between population and resources is a national
(indeed a global), as distinguished from a local problem, Congress
quite clearly has the power to enact legislation to subsidize population-
related research and development; to pay for family planning, contra-
ception, abortion and sterilization; to change tax laws to provide incen-
tives for the exercise of reproductive responsibility; and even to pay di-
rect subsidies, on an equal basis, to women not giving birth to children.
Congressional power under the welfare clause is extremely broad and
pursuant to its spending power Congress can enact any of the voluntary
programs suggested in this article.
2. Commerce Clause Power
Section 8 of article I provides:
The Congress shall have power.
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
Section 9 of article I provides:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
the Congress prior to the Year [1808], but a Tax or duty may be
imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.
The history of the expansion of federal power under the com-
merce clause is well known to the legal profession. Gibbons v. Ogden57
established that the Federal Government has paramount jurisdiction over
54. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968).
55. See In re United States, 28 F. Supp. 758 (D.C.N.Y. 1939).
56. Adler v. Adler, 192 Misc. 953, 81 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. City
1948) (dictum). This view is based on Hamilton's belief that the Federal Government
obtained an independent grant of power under the welfare clause; the view has had
strong proponents, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937), and might yet be
resurrected in an hour of national need.
57. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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interstate commerce. It was Mr. Justice Johnson's view in the Gibbons
case that the power was exclusive and that the states could not regulate
even in the absence of federal regulation."8 Chief Justice Marshall
found a "double aspect" whereby the states could exercise some power
over commerce. 59 Where the states acted under their reserved powers
relating to health, it was early settled that absent a federal-state conflict,
the states could regulate.60 In The License Cases"' and later in The
Passenger Cases,62 Chief Justice Taney developed the theory that the
states and the Federal Government had concurrent jurisdiction over
commerce.
The case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens63 resulted in a compro-
mise which generally represents the situation as it exists today. Over
matters which require uniform regularity, the Federal Government
has exclusive power.6 4 Over lesser matters which do not require uni-
form regulation, the states have concurrent power and may, in a non-
discriminatory manner, regulate until Congress has occupied the field. 5
Congress has the power under the commerce clause to take those
actions it deems necessary to effectuate population control, since it defi-
nitely appears that population is a matter which directly affects com-
merce. Commerce is the process through which the production, distri-
bution and consumption of goods and services occur. Since national
population size and geopgrahic distribution determine the total flow of
goods and services between the states, population directly affects inter-
state commerce and the Federal Government has power to regulate it.
It was early settled that some regulation of population is properly
within the commerce clause. In Gibbons v. Ogden,6 it was stated by
Chief Justice Marshall that section 9 of article I-the "immigration"
clause-is an exception from the power to regulate commerce67 granted
under section 8. In The Passenger Cases68 it was held that the clause
58. Id. at 227.
59. Id. at 222.
60. Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
61. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
62. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 464 (1849) (dissenting opinion).
63. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
64. Id. at 319.
65. Id. at 319-21 (dictum).
66. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824);
67. Id. at 103.
68. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1847). See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580
(1884), popularly called the Head Money Cases.
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applied to others than slaves; that it applied to prohibition69 as well as
to regulation; and that the kind of commerce involved in population
policy extended to interstate commerce as well as to foreign commerce.
The fact that a birth occurs in only one state does not prevent
human reproduction from being within the ambit of the interstate com-
merce clause. Wholly intrastate activities may be federally regulated
if they have an impact on commerce beyond the state's boundaries."0
If Congress has power to regulate local production and consumption,
there should be no bar to the exercise of congressional power to regulate
the reproduction of people-who are, after all, the ultimate producers,
distributors and consumers.
An important question is whether the existence of federal power
bars the states from regulating population. The Cooley case did not
determine whether it is the commerce clause itself which prevents the
states from acting on matters of national concern, or whether the in-
tent of Congress is the limiting factor. If it is the commerce clause
which prevents the states from regulating commercial matters of na-
tional concern, the states presently have no power to regulate popula-
tion size since population size, locally as well as nationally, is a matter
of the utmost national importance and, for fairness, requires uniformity
of treatment. On the other hand, if the states' power over commerce
is limited only by the intent of Congress, the states may have power
to regulate population size directly since the acts of Congress to date
suggest no intent to limit the states in this regard. As a matter of gen-
eral population policy, the conclusion should be that federal power is
concurrent, and that the states may experiment with population limita-
tion policies until such time as the Federal Government occupies the
field.
Even if the Congress does not choose to regulate population di-
rectly as part of commerce, the regulation of abortion, and probably
of contraception and sterilization as well, is clearly within the scope of
its powers. Since the enactment of liberalized abortion laws in some
states, many persons have traveled across state lines to procure abor-
tions. Such travel clearly constitutes interstate commerce. 7' The Fed-
eral Government, therefore, has commerce clause power to enact legis-
lation which would declare national policy to be in favor of abortions
69. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 281 (1849). See Mishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
70. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
71. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255-56
(1964).
[Vol. 22
and against compulsory pregnancy, and which would render ineffective
the attempts of the states to deny, or even to regulate, abortions. The
Senate Bill introduced by Senator Packwood in the 91st Congress
72
can be viewed as a bill to regulate commerce by invalidating those state
laws which presently act as a depressant to the commercial activities in-
volved in providing abortion services.
73
3. Fourteenth Amendment Power
The 14th amendment protects persons against state action which
abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens or which denies due
process or equal protection. Section 5 of the 14th amendment pro-
vides:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.74
Section 5 has been construed to create in Congress power separate
from and additional to the enumerated powers of article 1.75 In Katz-
enbach v. Morgan71 it was stated:
Correctly viewed, section 5 is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In legislating pursuant to the provisions of section 5, congressional
power is not limited by the ability of the Supreme Court to find a denial
of 14th amendment rights. Legislation will be held appropriate and
constitutional if the Court is able to perceive some basis upon which
Congress might have thought there was a denial of due process or equal
protection. 77  Under the authority of United States v. Guest,78 section
5 may justify congressional action which purports to affect wholly pri-
vate, as distinguished from state action.79 It has even been suggested
that section 5 creates a vast area of power pursuant to which Congress
might abolish most state regulatory powers.
80
72. S. 3746, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
73. Since the present diversity of state laws covering abortion practice tends to
deny abortions to the poor and poorly educated, the bill, and others having to do with
contraception and sterilization, can also be sustained under the provisions of section 5
of the 14th amendment. See text accompanying notes 84-86 infra.
74. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5.
75. See Katzenbach V. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745 (1966).
76. 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
77. Id. at 648-49.
78. 383 U.S. 745, 784 (1966).
79. See Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. RPv. 91, 173 (1966).
80. Comment, Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement and Congressional Power
to Abolish the States, 55 CALiF. L. REv. 293, 315 (1967).
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Commentators have noted that the combined effects of the Morgan
and Guest decisions may permit Congress to take broad legislative ac-
tion in areas hitherto thought to rest exclusively within the power of the
states.8 ' Although the lower federal courts have not yet been willing
to extend the ambit of the Morgan and Guest cases,82 it is reasonable to
expect the Supreme Court cautiously, on a case-by-case basis, to permit
Congress to pass statutes under section 5 to meet the national problems
that involve all the broad areas generally thought of as human rights.
The Morgan case is soundly rooted in established constitutional princi-
ples, yet it clears the way for a vast expansion of congressional legisla-
tion promoting human rights.8 3
Population control measures are not usually viewed as promoting
human or civil rights; however, many existing laws which relate to the
population problem presently abridge constitutionally protected rights.
Statutes which tend to deny a woman the right to choose whether or not
to bear children are unconstitutional,8 4 and statutes to prevent the dis-
semination and use of birth control information are probably uncon-
81. Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. Rnv. 91, 107 (1966);
Frantz, Federal Power to Protect Civil Rights: The Price and Guest Cases, 4 L
TRANS. Q. 63, 69-73 (1967); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the
"State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855, 872
(1966); Note, Fourteenth Amendment Congressional Power to Legislate Against
Private Discriminations: The Guest Case, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 586, 599 (1967).
82. In Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41 (1969) the
court noted that section 5 does not yet permit Congress directly to regulate the sale
or disposition of private property. However, the federal anti-blockbusting statute was
upheld under the 13th amendment and an injunction was issued against purely private
action. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969) it was stated:
"While we. . . certainly do not disparage the prognostications of numerous commenta-
tors who read in Guest the eventual demise of the state action requirement, we cannot
subscribe to the view that Guest has fulfilled this promised potential." Id. at 820.
83. Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HbAv. L. REv. 91, 107 (1966). In
the light of recent appointments to the Court it may be that this prediction will prove
false. In United States v. Arizona, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970), the Burger, Blackman wing
of the Court was unwilling to find power in Congress under section 5 to lower the
voting age in state elections. Id. at 260. On the other hand, a careful reading of all
the opinions in the Arizona case makes it clear that the ambit of section 5 has not yet
been expressly restricted. The Burger, Blackman and Stewart view of section 5 as
expressed in the Arizona case is not comprehensive; Justices Douglas, Brennan, White
and Marshall clearly favor the broader view of section 5.
84. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 302 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (recognizing a
woman's ninth amendment right to decide whether she should carry or reject an embryo
which has not yet quickened); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-35
(D.C. 1969) (denial of due process and equal protection); People v. Belous, 71 Cal.
2d 954, 963, 485 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
915 (1970) (alternative holding: anti-abortion statute unconstitutional as a restriction
upon the woman's right to privacy and her right to life).
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stitutional. 85
State statutes limiting contraception, sterilization and abortion in-
volve a denial of equal protection since the practical effect of the stat-
utes is to deny population control to the poor and uneducated while
leaving such control available to the wealthy. 6 Pursuant to the powers
conferred upon it by section 5 of the 14th amendment, Congress can en-
act legislation to invalidate all state laws which limit the application of
these population control measures. In addition to invalidating state
legislation, the Federal Government may also have power under the
enabling clause to enact affirmative population control laws. Under
the doctrine of Katzenbach v. Morgan,87 Congress has the power to
establish national standards with which the states must comply where
adoption of a different standard by the states might result in discrimina-
tory state action against a class of individuals. Thus, a state might be
required to make population control measures lawfully available to any
person requesting them on the basis that a failure to make them available
would constitute a denial of equal protection. Such laws could provide
criminal sanctions against private individuals and agencies who refused
to make population control devices and techniques available, 88 pro-
vided that the private conduct were not specifically protected by some
other constitutional right-such as the possible right of a Catholic doc-
tor to refuse to perform abortions for personal religious reasons.8 9
In the event that voluntary population control proves ineffective,
Congress probably has the power, pursuant to section 5, to regulate
reproduction directly. When the population becomes so great that the
demand on natural resources exceeds the available supply, it would seem
to be a clear denial of equal protection to allow continued, indiscrimi-
nate reproduction by those persons having the wherewithal to provide
for their offspring, to the detriment of those who do not. This con-
clusion is supported by the fact that the entire present membership of
the Supreme Court grants that the ambit of the 14th amendment ex-
tends at the very least to matters in which there is a component of racial
85. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Baird v. Eisenhadt, 429 F.2d
1398 (1st Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574, 580 (1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 1029 (1970).
86. See United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969).
87. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
88. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
89. Where the constitutional right of a woman to an abortion conflicts di-
rectly with the constitutional right of a doctor not to be required to act contrary to his
religious beliefs, the balancing should favor the doctor, provided the doctor makes
effective efforts to obtain from some other source the medical services to which the
woman has a right.
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inequality. 90 In any event, to assure due process and equal protection,
the regulation of population growth should be applied to genetically
identifiable groups as well as to individuals. National population policy
cannot, in the long run, be administered fairly on a state or local level.
In the event that it becomes necessary to license births and to punish ex-
cessive reproduction, section 5 embodies the grant of power necessary to
sustain direct federal regulation of human reproduction and to ensure its
responsible application at every level of society.
IV. Limitations on the Power to Control Population
A. The Fourteenth Amendment
It is immediately apparent that, although Congress unquestion-
ably has some power to regulate population growth, there are constitu-
tional limitations on the exercise of that power. Implementing effective
population control measures while safeguarding the individual freedoms
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and by the Civil War amendments will
be one of the most challenging tasks with which Congress will be con-
fronted in the future. The courts will undoubtedly be called upon to
delineate those areas of individual freedoms upon which Congress may
not impinge, regardless of the degree of crisis, although it is probably
true that the protected freedoms will diminish as the crisis increases.
1. Persons Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
A crucial question with respect to population control measures is
who is a "person" for purposes of the 14th amendment.
The first clause of the 14th amendment makes it reasonably clear
that to be a "person," one must already have been born; the first clause
specifically protects only those "persons born or naturalized." A per-
son conceived in but not born in the United States is not a "person" for
the purposes of citizenship,91 and it has never been held that a fetus is a
"person" for purposes of the 14th amendment.92
90. Justice Black's view in United States v. Arizona, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970), is that
the 14th amendment was not intended to protect against every discrimination between
groups of people but that it does protect against "every distinction, however trifling, on
account of race." Id. at 266. If the 14th amendment, including section 5 thereof, is
interpreted to apply only to racial inequality, the effect of state legislation on the
inevitable racial component of reproduction could bring the area of population control
within even this restrictive view.
91. Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1960), affd sub nom. Mon-
tana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
92. A fetus is not a person within the meaning of the federal tax laws. Wilson
v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 456, 457 (1940).
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Children are clearly "persons" within the meaning of the 14th
amendment. 3 In Levy v. Louisiana,94 the Supreme Court stated:
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not
"nonpersons." They are humans, live, and have their being. They
are clearly "persons" within the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause. .... 95
If the Levy case can be taken as establishing a test for the existence
of a person as that word is employed in the 14th amendment, the cri-
terion appears to be the simultaneous occurrence of the following char-
acteristics: (a) human; (b) alive; and (c) "having its being." Every
ovum and sperm is human and alive; however, the essence of the Levy
test is in determining whether an organism of live, human cells has de-
veloped to the point where it "has its own being."
It is important to distinguish between the commencement of hu-
man life and the commencement of "human being." Scientists, theolo-
gians and moralists agree on this one point at least: human life does not
begin. Rather, human life began at some time in the distant past, and
every subsequent living human cell is a continuation of that ife. The
ovum or sperm is a continuation of the adult; the embryo a continuation
of the sperm and egg; the fetus of the embryo, and so forth through the
birth of an infant. The 14th amendment clearly was not intended to
protect every single human cell, nor even every embryo. As indicated
by the Levy case, the 14th amendment protects "human beings."'96 It
is therefore necessary to determine at what point in the process of human
development a group of human cells becomes a human being, or a per-
son.
A number of jurisdictions have held that a quickened, viable fetus
is a person within the meaning of civil wrongful death statutes.
97
Others have held that the unborn, fully developed and viable fetus is not
a person.98 When the rights of the parents and the needs of society
93. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968); see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13
(1966); Police Comm'n v. Siegel Enterprises, Inc., 223 Md. 110, 162 A.2d 727 (1960).
94. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
95. Id. at 70.
96. "The term 'person' used in the Fifth Amendment is broad enough to in-
clude any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the republic." Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1896) (concurring opinion of Field, J.)
(emphasis added); see Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925, 928 (W.D.S.C. 1956)
(wife is a "person" within the meaning of the 14th amendment because she is a
"human being").
97. See, e.g., Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 283, 72 So. 2d 434, 440 (1954);
Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 263, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1960) (must be "capable of
an independent life apart from its mother").
98. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17, 52 Am. R. 242
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coincide with the interests of the fetus, as in wrongful death actions,
there may be no serious objection to classifying a fetus as a person for
that limited purpose. But where the "rights" of a fetus conflict with the
rights of the mother and with the needs of society, the cases involving
wrongful death are of little or no assistance.
In an exhaustive and well-reasoned opinion in Keeler v. Superior
Court of Amador County,99 the California Supreme Court held that for
the purpose of murder,' 0 "human being" has "the settled common law
meaning of a person who had been born alive. . . ."10' As a result
of the Keeler decision, the California Legislature amended section 187
of its Penal Code to define murder as "the unlawful killing of a human
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."'
10 2
While the fetus is still within the womb, it does not appear to satisfy
the requirements of the Levy test, that there be a human, live being. Un-
less "being" is construed to mean actual independent physical existence,
the requirement is superfluous. All human cells, including the unferti-
lized egg, are live and human, but certainly cannot be considered per-
sons. Without the distinction between actual independent and poten-
tial independent physical existence, there is neither a means nor a need
to distinguish between infant, fetus, embryo or ovum for the purposes
of determining when a "person" exists. The drafters of the 14th
amendment undoubtedly understood "person" to mean a live human
being, existing independently after the moment of birth. Even the com-
mon law did not consider the fetus to be a human being.'0 s
There are sound, pragmatic reasons why live birth should be the
(1884) (cited with approval on this point in National Council V.A.M. v. State Council,
203 U.S. 151, 161 (1906) (Holmes, J.) ); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 244, 319
S.W.2d 221, 225 (1958) (9 1/2 month fetus capable of existence separate and apart
from his mother held not a "person").
99. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1970).
100. Since killing a fetus was not murder or manslaughter at common law, a fetus
not having been considered a human being, some states passed statutes to create the
crime of feticide. See, e.g., N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 8, quoted in
2 Cal. 3d at 628, 470 P.2d at 621, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
101. 2 Cal. 3d at 628, 470 P.2d at 622, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (1970).
102. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1311, § 1, at 567. The drafters of our Constitution
were well aware of different kinds of persons, e.g., citizens, freemen, slaves, indigents,
fugitives from justice and the like. If they had intended "person" to include fetuses
they would have said so.
103. Keeler exhaustively examines the common law as it existed at the time of
the enactment of the 14th amendment. See Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act:
An Answer to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 285, 305-06 (1966). "It is extremely
difficult to justify the claim that an unborn child is constitutionally protected against
abortion. .. ."
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point in time at which 14th amendment protections attach to developing
human cells.104  Until live birth occurs, the fetus is physically depend-
ent on the mother, and its 14th amendment protection should be lim-
ited to those rights afforded to the mother. This will prevent constitu-
tional conflicts from arising between the mother's rights and the "rights"
of the fetus. Furthermore, unlike the moment of fertilization or "quick-
ening," the moment of birth is a relatively precise moment, easily ascer-
tainable, and is the time from which almost all other degal consequences
are dated;105 the inception of constitutional guarantees should not de-
pend on vague imprecisions. Perhaps the most compelling reason,
however, is the population problem itself. At this late date, to extend
the 14th amendment protections to the fetus would seriously impair
man's ability to solve the population problem.
Children and infants are entitled to 14th amendment protection.
Less developed, physically dependent organizations of human cells
are not. Without a constitutional amendment, infanticide cannot be
used to ameliorate the population problem; but abortion has been and
can be so used.106
2. Due Process and its Penumbra
The right to due process does not conflict with population con-
trol even though such extreme measures as compulsory birth control and
abortion are adopted. It has been held that the state can require vac-
cinations, physical examinations' °7 and can quarantine typhoid car-
riers.108  If the state can require vaccinations against communicable
diseases, there should be no bar to the state's requiring vaccination
against excessive births, the consequences of which may be far more
catastrophic than an epidemic. Since the state can perform compulsory
sterilization procedures in at least some instances,10 9 compulsory abor-
104. Birth is a point at which many very significant biological changes occur.
Heart, circulation, lung, liver and kidney changes occur abruptly at or about birth. 2
N. AssAu, BiOLOGY OF GEsrAnoN 4 (1968). There is even a significant discontinuity
in the overall growth curve which occurs at birth. See id. at 3, fig. 1. Thus birth is a
much more significant biological event than say the 20th or 24th week of gestation or
than the moment of quickening.
105. The date of birth is the legally relevant date which determines social
security rights, driving privileges, power to contract, draft duties and the like.
106. From the point of view of the fetus, compulsory abortion is no different from
voluntary abortion.
107. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); accord Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905).
108. Gates v. Prudential Ins. Co., 240 App. Div. 444, 446, 270 N.Y.S. 282, 284
(App. Div. Sup. Ct. 1934) (not decided on constitutional grounds).
109. Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) with Skinner v. Oklahoma,
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tion, with its far less serious consequences, 110 should not be unconsti-
tutional."'
Recent cases have developed and expanded the notion that the
14th amendment protects the individual's right of privacy. The Court
stated in dicta in Meyer v. Nebraska1 that the 14th amendment pro-
tects "the right. . to marry, establish a home and bring up children.
." In Griswold v. Connecticut"' the Supreme Court held that a
state statute prohibiting the use of birth control devices was unconstitu-
tional. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in Griswold, stated:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help given them life and substance. See Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-522 (dissenting opinion). Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association con-
tained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one. . . . The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of sol-
diers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all govern-
mental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life." We recently referred in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656,
to the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less im-
portant than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to
the people."...
We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights
of "privacy and repose." See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622, 626, 644; Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941). The Buck case held that compulsory sterilization of a
feeble-minded female did not violate the requirements of the due process clause. In
the Skinner case the compulsory sterilization of a "habitual criminal" was held to be
unconstitutional because it involved an unreasonable classification which denied equal
protection.
110. Abortion is less permanent in its procreative consequences than steriliza-
tion and is one of the very few medical procedures which can usually be reversed
within a short period of time.
111. Compulsory abortion would not involve the objection of unreasonable classifi-
cation found in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941), if every woman were
required by law to terminate her pregnancies after giving birth to two children.
112. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to study German in a private school).
113. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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451; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167; Lanza v. New York, 370
U.S. 139; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360; Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541. These cases bear witness that the right
of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use
of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive
impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light
of the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a "gov-
ernmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro-
tected freedoms."114
In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg stated:
Surely the Government, absent a showing of a compelling subordi-
nating state interest, could not decree that all husbands and wives
must be sterilized after two children have been born to them.115
People v. Belous,"6 relying on the Griswold case, held a Cali-
fornia anti-abortion statute to be unconstitutional, stating that absent
a compelling interest the state could not infringe on a woman's constitu-
tionally protected right to decide whether to have children. The reason-
ing was based on the woman's right not to accept the risk to her life
involved in childbirth and on her inherent right to privacy.
117
Neither Griswold nor Belous involved fact situations where there
was a compelling state interest requiring protection. The decision in
each case left open the possibility that the legislature might enact legis-
lation reaching into the private lives of spouses and parents if there were
a compelling, subordinating state interest.
Due process questions often involve balancing the interests of the
individual against the needs of the state. It might be argued that the
threat posed to the human race by the population explosion is not a suf-
ficiently compelling state interest to justify the extreme measures of
licensing births and compulsory abortion. Although there are those
who do not agree that the population explosion is a serious and compell-
ing problem,118 the weight of informed scientific authority" 9 compels a
114. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 496-97 (emphasis added).
116. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969).
117. See United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969), probable
juris. pending, 397 U.S. 1061 (1970), in which it was held that the District of Columbia
anti-abortion statute denied a woman due process; accord, Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F.
Supp. 293, 302 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
118. See, e.g., Coale, Low U.S. Birth Rate Not Entirely Desirable, UNIVERSITY,
Winter 1968-1969, at 3-7.
119. See notes 1-20 supra.
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finding that the population problem is indeed critical, i.e., compelling
and subordinating. The state need is clearly demonstrable although
the precise degree of urgency may be in some doubt.
Against the need of the state must be weighed the interests of the
individual. These include one's interest in having his body left alone
12
and the "right to found a family." Although the right to raise a family
has been mentioned as if it were a single, unitary right,121 it in fact in-
volves a number of different rights. First, there is the right to repro-
duce. This may be the right to have a child, or the right to replace one-
self-which for a couple involves two children. There may be some
right for couples to replace themselves with a boy and a girl. 122  At one
time there may have been a right to have as many children as desired.
Since the exercise of an unlimited right to have a family may involve
a denial of equal protection to all others, however, the courts and legal
scholars must be careful to distinguish between the right to replace
oneself and the highly questionable right to claim, through excessive re-
production, more than a fair and equal share of the world's resources.
There is presently a very fine balance between the individual in-
terests in having a family and being let alone and the right of the race
to survive. A continued population explosion will clearly tip the bal-
ance in the direction of the compelling, subordinating state interest
120. See note 42 supra; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv.
216 (1960).
121. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965); People v. Belous, 71
Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969).
122. Grandchildren may also be part of a person's family. Grandchildren are
issue and as such have inheritance rights, and after parents and issue, grandparents are
usually next in line for purposes of descent and distribution. See, e.g., CAL. PRoB.
CODE § 226. After the father and mother, the grandparent becomes the "guardian
by nature." Lehmer v. Hardy, 294 F. 407, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1923); In re Guardianship
of Lehr, 249 Iowa 625, 630, 87 N.W.2d 909, 912 (1958); In re Estate of Moore, 68
Wash. 2d 792, 797, 415 P.2d 653, 656 (1966). Grandparents may be permitted to
have custody of the grandchildren instead of and over the objection of a legally ap-
pointed guardian, Ridgeway v. Walter, 281 Ky. 140, 133 S.W.2d 748, 752 (1940),
and have visitation rights as to their grandchildren who reside with in-laws. Benner
v. Benner, 113 Cal. App. 2d 531, 532, 248 P.2d 425, 426 (1952); Scott v. Scott, 154 Ga.
659, 660, 115 S.E. 2, 3 (1922); Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 330 Ill. App. 506, 511, 71
N.E.2d 920, 922 (1947). A grandmother may be a "mother" within a statute saying
the "mother" can bring bastardy proceedings against the real father. Commonwealth v.
Abell, 75 Pa. Super. 267, 269 (Super. Ct. 1920). A grandparent can claim the
grandchild as a dependent for purposes of the federal income tax, Irr. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 152(a)(1), and a grandparent has an insurable interest in the grandchild,
e.g., National Life & Accident Co. v. Alexander, 226 Ala. 325, 147 So. 173 (1933); Hil-
liard v. Sanford, 6 Ohio Dec. 449, 4 Ohio N.P. 363 (1897). The right to have grand-
children is part of the right to have a family, and that right may limit the right to over-
produce children.
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which will justify compulsory population control programs. This is
perhaps the most persuasive reason why everything possible must be
done immediately to ameliorate the problem through voluntary methods.
If the problem is not solved voluntarily, there will be no constitutional
bars to compulsory population control. 123
3. Equal Protection
There is an important limitation which the Constitution places on
population control measures. Such measures must operate within the
requirements of the equal protection clause. This clause has been con-
strued to require de facto, as well as de jure, equal protection, 124 even
where economic disadvantage is the underlying cause.1 25  Thus, popu-
lation control measures which operate particularly upon minority or dis-
advantaged portions of society are barred by the 14th amendment.
Licensing provisions, however, that simply limit the number of children
any one woman may have do not pose equal protection problems.
Other, less drastic measures of population control do involve real
equal protection problems. Statutes have been introduced to limit the
income tax exemption to two children.121 Sociological data may demon-
strate that such statutes place a heavier burden on the poor-at least
insofar as the economic incentive for the poor is greater than for the
rich.'27 Similarly, direct annual subsidies to women of child bearing
age who do not have children would provide greater incentive to the
poor than to the rich. Such provisions might successfully be chal-
lenged under the equal protection clause. On the other hand, economic
incentives generally apply unequally-not all Americans, for example,
derive benefit from capital gains or from oil depletion allowances.' 28
123. There are those who convincingly argue that it is already too late for volun-
tary methods to be effective. See Chasteen, The Case for Compulsory Birth Control,
MADEMOISELLE, Jan. 1970 at 142, 158-59; Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SciENcr 1243, 1247-48 (1968).
124. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969), probable
jurls. noted, 397 U.S. 1061 (1970). See Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on
the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REV. 730,
770-73 (1968).
125. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (residency requirements for
welfare unconstitutional); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (free transcripts
on appeal).
126. E.g., S. 3632, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
127. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963); Smith v. Bennett,
364 U.S. 708, 712 (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-20 (1956).
128. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 167(j)-(k) (measures to promote investment in
housing), 169 (promotion of air pollution control facilities).
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The compelling nature of the population problem probably should
justify some economic inequality of application, despite the special, pri-
vate nature of the marriage and the child-parent relationships.
In assessing the applicability of the equal protection clause, the test
should not be whether a particular measure tends to reduce the num-
ber of births in some groups as compared to others, but whether some
groups are encouraged to have fewer children per couple than other
groups. There should be no equal protection problem even if it is
shown that high-birth-rate groups are encouraged or required to lower
their birth rates more than low-birth-rate groups. Nor should it be an
unreasonable classification to distinguish between groups having a
high birth rate and those whose rates are low. The equal protection
clause should apply only where a genetically identifiable group is en-
couraged or required to have a lower absolute birth rate than the na-
tional average; eliminating the abuses of the privilege to reproduce
ought not be a denial of constitutional rights.
Although there appears to be no constitutional bar to any of the
methods of population control mentioned in this article (except infanti-
cide), there are sound social reasons why certain methods should be
preferred. One compelling reason is to avoid exacerbating the nation's
racial problems. Blacks believe that they are treated unfairly and many
believe, perhaps accurately, that the only way they can obtain equal
treatment is by increasing their population, thereby increasing their
political power.129 Until deprived minorities are given truly equal op-
portunity, it is probably unwise to attempt to induce them to lower their
population growth to the level required by the nation as a whole.1
30
B. Separation of Church and State
Given that there is a particularly compelling public interest in con-
trolling the population explosion, many well-established precedents
suggest that the first amendment provision regarding the separation of
129. Unfortunately, it is the poor and deprived who suffer most from the problems
created by the population explosion. Minority groups do not consume as much on the
average as whites, but they suffer more from urban pollution and decay-population-
related phenomena. Informed blacks realize they have a direct interest in population
control. When riots occurred in Detroit, one whole block was destroyed, except a
black people's church and the birth control clinic. Recently in Philadelpha, the Black
Panther Party drew up its Revolutionary People's Constitution, which calls for "Free
abortion, sterilization and contraceptive devices for men and women." San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Sept. 8, 1970, at 3, col. 4. See Birth Control and the Negro Woman,
EBONY, Mar. 1968, at 29-37.
130. Ehrlich & Ehrlich, Population Control and Genocide, 2 NATIONAL DEMOCRA-
TIC COALITION NEWSLETTER 5 (July 1970).
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church and state do not bar the Government from enacting laws to li-
cense births and to require compulsory abortion and sterilization. It
seems well established that laws requiring marriage licenses are valid,
and it has been specifically held that Jaws prohibiting polygamy are
constitutional in the face of first amendment objections.1 31 If the state
may properly prevent a man from marrying' 32 or from having more than
one wife,133 it should also have the power to regulate reproduction,
either for the benefit of civilization or to improve the circumstances in
which man lives.
It has already been held that the basic relationship between parent
and child does not prevent the state from enacting laws requiring par-
ents to treat their children in a manner contrary to the parent's religious
beliefs. In Prince v. Massachusetts" it was held that the child labor
laws could be enforced to prevent a parent from having his child distrib-
ute religious literature. The Amish have been required to educate their
children,135 the Christian Scientists can be compelled to accept medi-
cal attention for critically ill children'3" and apparently the state can
even compel a pregnant woman to accept a blood transfusion to save
her child.' 3 7  There appears to be no serious legal impediment to re-
quiring religious minorities and other particularly fecund groups to
limit their reproduction for the public good.
C. Ninth Amendment
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, its framers expressed con-
cern that the enumeration of certain personal rights in the first eight
amendments might be construed as a limitation on other rights which
131. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1878); see Davis v. Bea-
son, 133 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1890) (disenfranchisement for polygamy); Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 47 (1885) (exclusion from public office). Religious belief is no
defense to a prosecution for use of peyote, State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 239, 243
P. 1067, 1073 (1926), or for fortune telling. See State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 569,
125 P. 939, 940 (1912).
132. Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 243, 61 A. 604, 605 (1905) (statute
prohibiting marriage of epileptics).
133. E.g., CAL. Cv. CODE § 4401.
134. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
135. See, e.g., State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966).
136. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 448,
504 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People ex rel. Wallace v. La-
brenz, 411 Ill. 618, 626, 104 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1952).
137. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537
(1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Application of the President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.D.C. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964).
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were not enumerated. 1 8  The fear was that certain "natural" rights1m
inhering in the individual could be destroyed by the Federal Govern-
ment. Accordingly, the ninth amendment was added to the Bill of
Rights to provide:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The right to have children may be protected under the ninth
amendment, although the extent of and the limitations upon that right
are not clear. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, arti-
cle 16, expressly affirms the right of all men "to found a family," but
does not indicate any limitations upon that right. Justice Goldberg, in
the Griswold case, stated that:
IT]he entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights
to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar
order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically pro-
tected.14
0
In assessing Griswold, one writer has asserted:
[Tihe freedom of the marital relationship is part of the bundle of
rights associated with home, family and marriage-rights sup-
ported by precedent, history and common understanding.
141
The existing authorities suggest that the right to choose whether to
have children is a fundamental right, at least to the extent that the state
may not compel a woman to suffer compulsory pregnancy. 142  The
right also exists to have a family, but that right does not necessarily in-
clude the right to have an unlimited family. The ninth amendment
should be interpreted to guarantee only so many children for each man
as the world can sustain over an extended period of time-and only so
many children as the world can sustain without destroying life, liberty,
property and the pursuit of happiness.
138. THE FEDERALST No. 84, at 537-44 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)
quoted by Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People?" 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 787, 805 (1962).
139. Some "natural rights" older than the Constitution are protected by the ninth
amendment. "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights--older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
140. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring opinion).
141. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 235, 258 (1965).
142. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1970) probable juris.
noted, 397 U.S. 1061 (1970); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970);
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359
(1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
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The ninth amendment has been little used'43 and the only ninth
amendment case which involves population matters is the Griswold
case. As demonstrated, Griswold stands for the proposition that the
right to have children is a fundamental, constitutionally protected right.
But the Griswold case also supports the proposition that given a "com-
pelling, subordinating" state interest, the right to have children does
not confer a right to have "too many" children.
V. Conclusion
Throughout most of man's history the rate of physical change was
very slow. Man's population growth-rate was slow, and his cultural in-
stitutions, including the law, changed slowly. While the rate of physical
change remained nominal, a slow rate of change in man's institutions
was sensible since most changes, like most mutations, were likely to be
detrimental rather than beneficial.
During the last two decades, however, it has become clear that the
present patterns of population and pollution cannot continue without
leading man to catastrophe and possible extinction. Because of the in-
creasing rate of physical change in the world, the rate of change in man's
most basic institutions must be similarly increased. This means chang-
ing the family structure to put less emphasis on child rearing and more
emphasis on activities unrelated to reproduction; changing our basic
economic institutions to provide for a sustained, stable economy instead
of an unlimited growth economy; and changing our religious values.
The change from a rapidly increasing population to either a stable
or declining population will mean at least as much dislocation in our
basic institutions as occurred in the agricultural and industrial revolu-
tions. The law must anticipate these dislocations, for nothing could be
worse than leaving the present patterns to operate as they are now
operating. The law must experiment and undertake population control
measures whose efficacy has not been definitely established. It must
have courage to take the unmeasured chances necessary to avoid the
oblivion which man is rapidly approaching.
143. Nonenumerated rights do exist, although they have not as yet been protected
specifically under the ninth amendment. Some nonenumerated rights are the right to
practice a profession, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262 (1957), the right to
political privacy, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957), and the
right to marry as one chooses, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The right to
marry, establish a home and bring up children may be protected. Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The right to procreate is a basic right of man.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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